Ultima Thule

In ancient times the northernmost region of the habitable world - hence, any distant, unknown or mysterious land.

Tuesday, February 28, 2006


By Aussiegirl

Dr. Walid Phares, writing on the Counterterrorism Blog, takes a closer look at the factors at play in this entire ports controversy. First he lays out the unfortunate fact that the matter has become politicized, and as such, has lost the needed focus on matters of security. He lays to rest the canards about "racism" and several other arguments put out by the DPW proponents before getting to the meat of the matter -- how exactly could this deal endanger our security and what methods would terrorists use to take advantage of this deal. This is what he had to say:


In the original explanation of the deal, officials reassured people with concerns that there was no threat coming from the UAE because “the company is to manage the administrative space of the ports operations exclusively, not the security areas.” While the argument is logical, that isn’t the logic of the would-be terrorists. Bureaucracy and security are intertwined when it comes to strategic penetration. Al Qaida teams aren’t going to play a Hollywoodian James Bond movie and we’re not going to necessarily see Dubai CEOs jumping on a freight boat strapped with kilograms of TNT. Things are not square and triangular in the Terrorism business, but more fluid. The Jihadists won’t be that obvious in their use of a potential infiltration. The deeper danger of penetration will be more complex: First, the enemy will penetrate from the UAE end, aided by Salafi or even Khumeinist sympathizers. This first line of defense could be breached by hiring elements to form a network inside the company, or subcontracted “hostile” entities in the future. Second, while moving inside the layers of the “management” the “net” could then hire elements coming from the American side. If we project that Jihadists are operating inside the US, a UAE company “managing” six main US ports would be a first rate opportunity for them to “connect.” Hence, one can project that once a “network” installs itself inside the corporation, it would be able to recruit US citizens and residents sympathizers with or part of the movement. A bridge would thus be established between the outside cells and the inside cells through a perfectly legitimate outlet.

Action would come once the bridge is operational. It could develop into multiple directions. General intelligence and spying in the US is only one possibility. Storing material in these sensitive areas is two. Learning about the security systems in these ports from the administrative end is three. Disrupting national security operations is four. The deeper the layers, the wider possibilities would open to the Jihadists. But the initial “hole” is what allows the chain to develop.


Post a Comment

<< Home